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"To plan 1s to choose; choose to go forward", President Julius Nyerere
For a majority of sub-Saharan African economies and sub-Saharan 
Africans the period since 1979 has been one of sustained or escalating crises 
and of stagnation or decline; for many 1 t has been one of economic disaster. 
There are exceptions —  of economies and of population groups, and of Institu­
tions and enterprises —  and disagreement over degree and detail, but the 
overall record of lack of success 1 s both plain to read and broadly agreed (1 ).
There 1s less agreement on the record of the decade of the 1970s, be­
cause 1t 1s much more diverse by country and by sub-period. In the period
1970-73, and even more so 1n 1974-75, sub-Saharan Africa's overall record was 
poor relative to the 1960s, as well as relative to all developing countries as
a group. On the other hand, growth during 1976-79 was —  for Africa as a
whole —  at least 5 per cent annually, well above Its own historic average and 
of the same magnitude as that of the developing countries as a group (2 ).
Within that averge there was wide diversity: several economies showed
continuing weakness, and there was also a general weakness 1 n the agricultural 
sector, especially 1n the Industrial and export crop sub-sectors. But for the 
majority of sub-Saharan economies 1t 1s not historically accurate to see the 
1976-79 period as one of continuous drift toward stagnation and decline, or of
failure to overcome 1973-74 external shocks (3).
An understanding of the record of the 1970s 1s Important and does not
deny the generality or depth of the post-1979 decline. That record suggests
that the direct causation and timing of the post-1979 decline was largely
exogenous and that, except 1 n a handful of cases, a decline 1 n national
command over resources, not a rapid Increase 1 n expenditure, was the driving 
force behind growing external and Internal Imbalances. While this perception 
does not alter the need to respond to the present crisis, 1 t may well alter
perspectives on how the responses should be structured.
The prospects for the next decade are but little better than the record
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f the past half decade. On relatively optimistic estimates (4) as to the 
international economic and financial contexts, the World Bank projects maximum 
m e l y  sub-Saharan growth rates more or less equal to population growth during 
985-1995 (5)- Since these projections assume Increased shares of exports and 
of savings, they Imply continued falls 1n real per capita consumption. Such 
reductions 1n consumption would follow the 15-20 per cent reductions (1n
several countries over 33 per cent) since 1979, to levels near or below those 
of 1970 or, 1n extreme cases, 1960. Again there are national exceptions, and 
j margin of error 1 n projections (6 ), but —  unless something 1 s done,
rapidly, generally and backed by adequate resource allocations —  the general 
message 1 s that on present trends most sub-Saharan economies are, at best, 
Bound for a decade of stabilised stagnation (7). The need for action 1s only 
too clear and the costs of delay are already high and rapidly escalating. 
People are starving, and more are being ground Into abject poverty. Children 
are being deprived both of education and of the food and medical services
needed to take advantage of 1 t, societies and polities are being strained and
eroded to the verge of breakdown and disintegration or beyond. Lack of Inputs 
and of maintenance 1 s not merely causing current losses but rapidly under­
lining the very productive base on which recovery must be built. In 
political and national terms continued stagnation makes the mobilisation of 
energy ever harder: confidence 1 n the ability to succeed 1 s Increasingly
eroded by repeated failures, whatever their cause. Unfortunately, both 
nationally and Internationally there 1 s often an unhappy mix of frenetic, 1 1 1  
thought out attempted action, which proves unsustainable, together with 
interminable debate and negotiation over secondary Issues.
The backdrop to the prevailing economic malaise, and the urgent need 
tor action, do not by themselves define solutions. But the need for struc­
tural change, at least economically, 1 s no longer at Issue even 1 f Its nature, 
diversity and phasing are. Certain essential elements can be Identified:
-- the basic barriers to stabilisation, recovery and renewed develop­
ment must be addressed;
-- the present potential to produce, and present opportunities to
restore both production and human welfare, must be utilised;
-- enough resources must be allocated or reallocated to meet priority 
targets;
-- while there must be a realistic perception of the limits to what can
be achieved rapidly, there must also be an appreciation of the
limits to which per capita stagnation or decline can be borne 
without evolving Into something much worse.
It 1s doubtful whether more than a handful of African economies are 
apable of movement on all four elements; certainly they cannot 1 n most cases 
pe met without either Increased or at the least radically altered flows (8 ) of
net foreign resource transfers (9). Certainly, Import strangulation 1s a
major cause of the present economic malaise and a major barrier to overcoming 
't (10).
Responses to crises
The proposition that the sudden worsening of sub-Saharan economic 
performance and prospects since 1979 has been largely the result of external 
shocks and only secondarily of domestic policy or practice does not, 1 n
Itself, define an appropriate course of action. What can be done? The 
simplest response 1 s to seek to strengthen existing Institutions and policies 
1 n the expectation that greater efficiency and moderate restraint will be 
enough (Botswana did achieve this over 1981-83 but 1n the context of a fairly 
strong Initial external balance position, and more moderate external shocks 
than are typical). When this option was pursued 1n the face of massive shocks 
and a worsening context (as 1n Tanzania over 1979-80) the results are likely 
to be such large cuts 1 n resource allocations as to render all targets un­
attainable; to reduce, rather than Increase, the efficiency of Institutions 
and of policies; and to exacerbate the decline 1 n output.
A second approach 1s to maintain basic strategic goals but to reformu­
late targets, priorities and sequences, for example: Increase the emphasis on
export expansion 1 n order to limit cuts 1 n critical Imports; stretch out pro­
grammes to broaden access to pure water 1 n order to release funds to maintain 
and rehabilitate existing systems; cut Investment 1 n new projects so as to 
free Import capacity to operate existing units; loosen recurrent budget 
balance criteria to avert the collapse of key productive sectors or basic 
services. In the absence of Increased external resource Inflows 1t 1s open to
question how many sub-Saharan economies retain enough strength and balance to
be able to follow this course, optimal though 1 t would appear to be.
A third approach 1s to alter the basic strategy —  and therefore Its 
short- and medium-term political/economic goals —  and start afresh. This 1s 
likely to be practicable only 1 n the context of near total economic collapse 
and/or of a new government (e.g. Uganda 1n 1981, Ghana 1n 1983), and even then 
only 1 f significant external resources are made available to cover the costs 
of reconstruction.
It 1s clear that action which amounts to restructuring and rescheduling 
1n one country, can amount to abandoning goals 1n another. In Botswana and 
Tanzania abandoning the specific medium-term goals of universal access to 
basic education, primary health care and pure water would be a major political 
shift, but 1 n many other countries such targeted policies have never- been 
serious operational goals and their formal abandonment would scarcely affect 
political credibility. Thus while there are political constraints on possible 
changes 1n all sub-Saharan states, their significance depends on a blend of 
several factors: the specific socio-economic structures, the makeup of the
dominant sub-class coalition (and the probability of Its changing), the per­
ception (by workers, peasants, managers and proprietors as well as political 
leaders) of what 1 s crucial 1 n political/economic terms, and the economic 
record of the past two and a half decades. Any attempt to Ignore these 
realities of diversity and prescribe a uniform agenda for action, as opposed 
to broadly applicable guidelines, has little prospect of either economic ef­
ficiency or sustained viability.
Emergence from economic malaise can be divided conceptually Into four
stages:
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  ctahl1 1 sat1 o n . I.e. halting absolute decline, and limiting per
capita decline, 1 n order to create a foundation from which to re-
bu 1 Id;
__ rphab1 l1 tat 1 on of eroded capacity 1 n production, Infrastructure, 
basic services. Institutional competence and policy making/
Implementation;
  recovery, basically rehabilitation plus Investment to overcome
critical bottlenecks, to raise output and consumption to aggregate 
levels approximating those of 1979 (and to per capita ones approxi­
mating 1979 for food and basic services), and sustain growth of
aggregate production and consumption (1 1 ) at least equal to that of 
population growth;
  renewed development Including, but not limited to, patterns of
production growth consistent with sustaining Internal and external
balance as well as Increasing average personal and communal consump­
tion, while avoiding 1 mm 1 ser 1 sat1 on of vulnerable groups of people.
A handful of sub-Saharan African economies (notably that of Botswana)
can start with the fourth stage. If they are able to act promptly on stabil­
isation a few more (for example Zimbabwe and the Ivory Coast) can largely 
avoid the need for massive rehabilitation because their productive capacity 1 s 
still endangered rather than debilitated. For a majority all four stages are 
relevant. In practice the first three overlap sequentially; the political 
and human costs of stabilisation are likely to prove unsustainable without 
some parallel recovery, while rehabilitation usually requires some parallel 
Investment 1 n stuctural change to overcome bottlenecks, which can be 
characterised as development, before full recovery 1 s achievable or sustain­
able.
There 1s fairly broad agreement on the above. To that extent the 
recent World Bank review of sub-Saharan Africa (12) 1s correct to speak of an 
'emerging consensus" and to argue that "delay 1 n taking action, whether by 
African governments or by donors, can no longer be justified". However, the 
level of agreement 1s very general and, as the Bank Itself notes, does not 
extend to detailed articulation, sequences, priorities and rates of 
change (13). In the actual formulation and Implementation of action these 
specifics can be very critical. As the Bank Implies, the cost of delay may be
greater than the Importance of some of the Issues —  a point perhaps particu­
larly relevant to Structural Adjustment Programme negotiations and often not 
adequately perceived by any of the parties to them. Nor 1s the agreement uni­
versal: within African states, and externally, there are dissenters whose
objections and criticisms, often from radically divergent perspectives or 
interests, do combine to delay or thwart action.
In order to proceed further 1n outlining what needs to be done, 1t 1s 
necessary to review some of the key sectors, Instruments and contentious 
Issues. Such a review can be no more than a sketch or check 11st for three 
reasons. The first 1s space. The second 1s the diversity of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The third 1s that external articulation of applied political economy, 
whether by academicians or Institutions, does not work well. Both African 
governments and Africans, and external Institutions and academicians, should 
reflect on the fact that over the 1970s agriculture was, 1 n most countries.
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the sector receiving the greatest relative attention and Increase 1 n re­
sources, and experiencing the sharpest policy and Institutional changes. It 
was also the sector 1 n which foreign personnel, advice and, frequently, re­
sources —  1 n large-scale projects —  were most dominant at all levels, from 
strategy through policy to project design. Implementation and frequently 
management (14).
Sectoral and Intrasectoral priorities
Seven broad sectors are of general priority: production which expands
exports or saves Imports, food, manufacturing, physical Infrastructure, human 
Infrastructure, Institutional Infrastructure, and the data and research 
Infrastructure.
All sub-Saharan economies must give priority to raising earned Import 
capacity. I.e. export expansion and expansion of import saving production. 
Export promotion and Import substitution need to be seen as two aspects of the 
same strategy of achieving external balance and sustainable development; they 
are not to be seen as alternatives or opposites. There can be extremely In­
efficient export promotion Just as there can be Inefficient Import substitu­
tion. There are no simple general answers (except wrong ones). The strategy 
should probably Involve selective, rather than sector-wide, policy Interven­
tion, as has been done, albeit 1n very different contexts, 1n Brazil, South 
Korea, Hungary and Taiwan.
Two dilemmas need to be recognised 1n respect of most traditional 
primary and semi-processed exports. If most producers raise output rapidly, 
the overall Impact on price will be such as to cause each to earn less foreign 
exchange. World relative prices for these traditional exports have been 
falling, with poor prospects for reversal In most cases. Therefore, to raise 
domestic real prices 1 s to contradict both the basic principles of market 
economics and to plan to back losers. But, on the other hand, to delink from 
these exports before alternatives are available can only lead to greater 
dependence on grants, loans and external policy direction, as well as to Im­
port cuts to a degree Inconsistent with attaining stabilisation, much less 
development.
In the short term most sub-Saharan economies must Identify the least 
unpromising options to raise exports. This would Include restoring debilita­
ted traditional exports (e.g. cocoa 1n Ghana, cashewnuts 1n Tanzania, copper 
1n Zambia), holding market shares 1n all but the most unpromising existing 
exports (e.g. Zimbabwe should seek to do so 1n steel and ferrochrome), 
capitalising on new natural resource based export potential (e.g. natural gas 
and Its products 1n Nigeria and Cameroon, pulp and paper 1n Tanzania, 
reassessed gold deposits 1n Zimbabwe, coal 1n Botswana and Mozambique), and 
developing new agricultural exports with reasonable market prospects (e.g. soy 
beans and maize 1n several countries). Over the slightly longer term, 
analysis of the potential for pre-export processing and manufacture (e.g. 
hides and skins, cotton, sisal, logs and timber, ores and concentrates), and 
1 ntra-reg1 onal trade 1 n manufactures (as well as energy and food), should 1 n 
most cases Identify potential for export expansion and diversification. What 
1 s uniformly needed 1 s more coherent and Imaginative analysis backed by more 
sustained and appropriate export promotion funding with clear priorities.
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However, export promotion will not be enough for a majority of sub-
h ran African economies, Including some past star export performers such as 
he Ivory Coast and Malawi. Equally systematic analysis of Import substitu­
tion potential and priorities 1s needed 1n basic foodstuffs (grains, oilseeds,
f1 sh, dairy products, and perhaps sugar) 1 n commercial fuel and energy, 
ui mass consumer goods and Intermediate Inputs Into them, 1 n construction 
materials, 1 n engineering, and 1 n tradable services (e.g. construction).
It 1s not clear whether the growing food problem 1s primarily a problem
of price, because the prices growers receive for most of their food sales are
not well known. Consumer food prices have risen more rapidly than other
prices 1n most African countries for over two decades, and official grower 
prices have, 1 n almost all cases, outpaced wages (and, often, the cost of 
living) since the late 1970s. This 1s not to say that too low official prices
may not deter output of specific crops. Nor 1s 1t to deny the need for more
rational and coherent setting of prices with greater regard for grower net
incomes, changes 1 n wages and other prices, and "free" market price Indica­
tors. These points are now conventional wisdom, and are partly (sometimes 
over-energetical 1y ) acted on 1n most of sub-Saharan Africa. But there 1s now 
a danger that other often essential conditions for price or other policy 
changes to affect food output will not receive adequate attention. Among 
these are:
a) the critical Importance of there being buyers who come to accessible 
points at known times and pay promptly;
b) the availability of transport to allow timely procurement and move­
ment of crops and movement of Inputs and "Incentive" goods (15);
c) even 1 f transport 1 s available, the absence, shortages and untimely
arrival of both agricultural production Inputs and of "Incentive" 
goods has become endemic even 1 n m 1 ddle-1 ncome countries like 
Nigeria; lack of Inputs lowers production potential, and without 
the desired consumer goods no price 1 s "real" to the peasant pro­
ducer;
d) Inadequate and overcentral 1 sed storage facilities which frequently 
lead to peaking of seasonal transport demand and thus maximisation 
of transport costs, high storage losses, and Inability to hold 
reserves;
e) basic services (health, education, accessible pure water, access to 
household fuel) are frequently debilitated or never existed, which
has direct negative production effects and equally clear dis­
incentive effects on staying 1 n rural areas at all;
f) agricultural research 1 s usually neither locally field tested, user 
net Income tested, nor tested for peasant acceptability so that, 
even 1f extended (which 1t often 1s not), 1t 1s Hkeley to have a
low acceptance rate and a lower positive output result; In fact,
for many food crops 1 n many areas applied reseach known to be rele­
vant does not exist at all.
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It 1s as critical to devise food production strategies to Identify and
to overcome these defects as to "get prices right" —  Indeed In a number of
cases 1 t 1 s probably more so.
By and large all these points relate to marketed food, I.e. to pro­
ducers with surpluses above household needs. But a significant proportion of 
the African food shortage arises 1n peasant households which cannot grow 
enough to provision themselves adequately. For them higher food prices are
Irrelevant (or harmful) and cash Input Intensive packages are usually finan­
cially Inaccessible. Far more attention 1s urgently needed 1n a significant 
number of countries on how to respond to the needs and problems of this group 
of hungry people (16).
Manufacturing 1 s often Inefficient, and cannot 1 n Itself solve un­
employment problems. Unfortunately this has tended to result 1n lack of
attention both to Its strengths (17) and to Its critical role 1n respect to
agriculture and government revenue. In a significant number of sub-Saharan 
economies many basic agricultural Inputs and most Incentive goods cannot be 
manufactured 1 n adequate quantities because foreign exchange for spares, 
direct Inputs and fuel 1s restricted; output may be at 25 per cent to 40 per 
cent of capacity (18), and production 1 s snapped up 1 n urban areas even though 
rural prices may be higher. Further, much of the recurrent budget deficit 
frequently results from steep falls 1 n the various tax receipts tied to 
domestic manufacturing activity. It 1s very difficult 1n these cases to see 
how stabilisation of the government budget can be achieved 1 n the absence of 
rehabilitation and recovery 1 n manufacturing.
The physical Infrastructure, viz. transport (Including rolling stock 
and vehicle parks), water supplies to enterprises, communications, energy and 
storage, are among the most debilitated sectors 1n many sub-Saharan econ­
omies. These are just as significant 1n raising the cost of production as 1n
causing direct output losses (19). The key missing element 1n almost all
cases 1s foreign exchange. In certain cases this 1s because external funds 
are available for new projects but not for rehabilitation or maintenance, a 
problem which 1 s sometimes exacerbated by a domestic preference for new pro­
jects.
The human Infrastructure viz. education, drinking water, health, 
domestic fuel, and housing 1 s, 1 n many cases, equally or more debilitated, 
especially 1n rural areas. Their Importance for production 1s frequently 
seriously underestimated, as 1 s the disincentive Impact of their absence or 
deterioration. Their relevance, particularly education, to future productive 
capacity 1 s more widely perceived, although their special relevance to vulner­
able groups (Including women and children and particularly those of poor 
households) 1s probably underestimated. Three priority needs can be Identi­
fied:
—  restoring effective coverage and quality 1 n what already exists 
(e.g. provision of paper, books, drugs, fuel, pump spares, staff 
retraining);
—  redesigning systems away from overconcentration on limited access, 
high quality sub-sectors toward more basic coverage;
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filling gaps, particularly 1 n specialised, middle-level training 
(e.g. artisans, surveyors, technicians, bookkeepers) and, as soon as 
resources permit, restoring advances toward universal access to 
basic services.
The institutional Infrastructure can be defined as knowledge, 
rt1 Se, and historic memory (e.g. useable, and used, filing and archive 
'"stems);' communications systems; accounting; co-ordination, and monitoring 
nd a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  generally (as well as within Institutions and Institutional 
^ub systems). This "sector" appears to have deteriorated radically 1n many 
•ub-Saharan states over the past few years, 1n part perhaps because workers at 
a n  levels have responded to negative real wage and salary Incentives. 
* improvements 1 n policy and management capabilities will be virtually Imposs­
ible unless this situation can be reversed. One finds that management 
a c c o u n t i n g  1 s weak or absent almost everywhere, and ex post financial account­
ing and accountability 1 s often little better.
The data and research Infrastructure 1s another sector which 
historically has been weak and which has deteriorated 1 n a majority of sub- 
iaharan economies, despite Increased resource allocations. National and 
institutional diversities are again substantial, but three general points can 
be made: there 1 s a need for setting priorities 1 n terms of critical user
needs (e.g. agricultural yield statistics, and peasant usability-tested crop 
research) and better feedback from users; more attention must be paid to 
having reasonably accurate data available 1n time to Inform decisions (Inform­
ation 1s too often erroneous, or correct but too late); and there must be 
«ore national and regional co-operation, ranging from exchange of Information 
to Joint training and programmes.
Policy Instruments
Nine Instruments for Implementing policies, projects and strategies 
stand out as deserving priority attention 1n most sub-Saharan countries: dis­
tribution. participation, Incentives, micro-management, macro-management, 
public sector effectiveness, private sector, regional co-ordination/ 
co-operation, and external resources. While distribution and participation 
can be seen as ends, they are here considered as means or Instruments.
0 1 strlbutlon and production are largely co-determ1 ned, therefore 
support and Incentives for production will directly Influence Income distribu­
tion. Redistribution after that 1s secondary. This fact 1s not always ade­
quately considered 1 n the selection of policies for Increased production, 
ihus the primary Influence on redistribution lies 1 n altering the ability to 
produce and the rewards for producing. The secondary area of Influence 1s the 
provision of basic services (which does overlap with the primary area, as 
these can raise the ability to produce). The tertiary area of Influence 1s 
direct transfer payments (which are very limited 1n sub-Saharan Africa 
relative to other regions and, unfortuately, predominantly to middle and upper 
income groups), and taxation. Any production policy or project, 1f success­
ful, affects primary redistribution. It 1s necessary to view this Impact both 
on a case-by-case, and overall, basis to ensure that the redistribution ef­
fects of production-oriented decisions are generally consistent with national 
distribution targets.
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Participation 1s more widely lauded than pursued 1n practice. Its 
first aspect, participation 1 n production, and Its second aspect, participa­
tion 1 n carrying out policies (e.g. community afforestation), are genuinely 
sought, albeit rarely with enough attention to what actually motivates 
peasants and workers to participate. Another dimension of participation, that 
of taking decisions and designing pol 1 c 1 es/proJects, 1 s honoured unevenly 1 n 
practice, and this falling frequently entails high costs 1 n selection and 
design mistakes, leading to poor participation 1 n Implementation and 1 n oper­
ational performance. Participation, 1n the sense of ability to hold officials 
and Institutions —  especially external agency personnel —  accountable, 1 s 
rarely endorsed even verbally and 1 s usually resisted 1 n practice at least as 
energetically 1n sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere. Political Implications 
aside, this absence of participation 1 n holding to account does damage to the 
other aspects of participation and thus perpetuates policy and Incentive mis­
takes .
The area of Incentives Includes prices: producer prices, wages, and
their relationship to Input and consumption goods prices. However, there are 
other Incentives. In the context of low or falling per capita output these 
require priority examination and strengthening where possible, precisely 
because so little can be done 1 n the areas of real prices and real wages. 
These Include the availability and quality of basic services and basic con­
sumer goods (Including construction materials), areas 1 n which 1 t should be 
possible during rehabilitation and recovery to do rather more than will be 
possible on the real wage and producer price fronts. Furthermore, Individual 
and group commitment and a sense of meaningful participation, and a belief 
that development (as defined by a person) 1 s attainable, are also critical 
motivating factors. Economists and economic decision takers often find 1t 
hard to relate to the latter factors, often to the detriment of the effective­
ness of strategy and policy packages, particularly when they Involve front-end 
costs and only longer-term gains.
Micro-managerial capacity at the Institutional level, 1n both the 
public and private sectors, 1 s an acknowledged pervasive weakness 1 n sub- 
Saharan Africa. Because of worsening national contexts, such capacity as 
exists 1 s Increasingly unable to combine day-to-day crisis management with 
normal ongoing supervision, annual operational planning and medium-term 
forward planning. Some corrective measures have been mentioned above under 
Institutional 1nfrastrucutre. Others relate to high and middle-level training 
(not least bookkeepers, accountants and auditors). Certain other contextual 
problems also exist, particularly with respect to government and public enter­
prise management. These relate to the overall structure and context within 
which micro-management takes place, viz. Inadequate autonomy and a lack of 
standards of performance and Incentives. While hardly unique to sub-Saharan 
Africa, these problems are frequently more extreme and, 1n the context of 
scarce and Inexperienced managers, often more costly 1 n terms of performance.
Macro-management Includes sectoral and overall decision taking and 
policy making. The most general problems relate to weaknesses 1n the genera­
tion, collection, analysis and use of data which 1 s needed to Inform de­
cisions, to design and Implement policies and programmes, to monitor results, 
and to achieve meaningful flexibility to take corrective action. Unfortu­
nately, these weaknesses are rarely seen as a cluster of related and endemic 
problems, and still more rarely are they given priority attention. Failure of 
co-ordination and of testing for consistency, particularly by central economic
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units, 1 s also frequently cited as a weakness, but serious action 1 s not often 
taken (perhaps with the exception of ad hoc expansion of Treasury powers, 
which may or may not be effective).
The question of public sector effectiveness requires subdivision Into 
government and public enterprise. In government there 1s frequently a need to 
prioritise 1 n order that the most Important functions (Including those for 
which there are no realistic private sector or community alternatives) are 
carried out adequately, even 1 f this means totally dropping some desirable but 
less critical services. A frequent problem at times of budgetary and foreign 
exchange constraints 1 s an Imbalance 1 n favour of personnel who then, for 
these very budgetary or foreign exchange reasons, do not have the resources to 
carry out their duties. Either fewer personnel, or larger budgetary and 
foreign exchange allocations, are essential to restoring operational balance 
1n such cases. Since real government expenditures, excluding for Interest and 
production Incentive subsidies, have fallen significantly 1 n most cases and 1 n 
certain key areas (maintenance and repair, basic health and medical services) 
which urgently need to be restored, Increased revenue 1s essential. Contrary 
to popular Impression, sub-Saharan governments' recurrent budgets are not 
particularly large relative to GDP (20), nor are the number of government 
employees large as a proportion of the economically active population.
Public enterprises also often suffer from overextension, and would 
benefit from prioritisation on a basis analogous to government. They are also 
subject to the micro-managerial weaknesses noted above. However, their per­
formance efficiency, on almost any criteria, varies widely among and within 
countries, and almost no generalisations are valid. Similarly the reasons for 
their creation or acquisition, the roles they play, and the presence or 
absence of real private sector alternatives are anything but uniform. There 
1 s therefore a general case for seeking to bring up the standards of the 
weakest priority public enterprise to those of the strongest, as well as 
phasing out low priority, unprofitable ones (2 1 ).
The private sector probably deserves more attention 1n most sub-Saharan 
economies, although this 1 s far more a matter of degree than of Ideology, 
since most are 1n fact mixed economies. A practical problem 1s that neither 
advocates nor critics of public enterprise 1n Africa have really examined the 
capacity, viability and efficiency of the private sector, and more specifi­
cally Its components: large, medium, small; domestic, foreign. These vary
widely, and the advocates of unleashing the private sector seem to over­
estimate the capabilities of these components both absolutely and relative to 
public sector enterprises (22). There are two specific Issues which need 
exploration. First, 1s the private sector a feasible alternative at the large 
enterprise level? Domestic private capacity 1s limited. Foreign Investors do 
not at present find sub-Saharan Africa attractive except for very special 
projects or 1n a handful of countries. Second, economic macro-management and 
m 1cro-1 ntervent1 on to balance private sector Incentives and broader national 
economic Interest 1s 1n general not a strong point of African states. Over­
regulation and unintended disincentives, and underregulation and unintended 
private windfalls, are all too frequent —  often 1 n the same state.
Regional economic co-ordination 1s, for most sub-Saharan states, a 
means of broadening the range of viable production and exports, reducing the 
costs of certain Institutions, programmes and Infrastructures, and for co­
ordinating the development and use of transport and communications
I %
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facilities. To achieve these ends 1t needs to be based on perceived mutual
Interests; these usually turn on production and transport, with trade being
consequential and not an end 1n Itself. This suggests a need to rethink ap­
proaches to co-ordination and co-operation: the orthodox trade preference
centred model has a rather resounding history of failure or very limited 
success 1n sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades. It appears to cor­
respond neither to the present economic structures and perceived priorities of 
most sub-Saharan states, nor to their preference for risk minimisation and
extensive use of exchange controls and Import licensing to regulate trade 
levels and sources. A more production-linked, pragmatic approach centred on 
balanced trade diversion toward group members would seem to stand a better 
chance of success.
External resources are critical to achieving stabilisation, rehabilita­
tion and recovery. First, more resources are needed. Second, these should be 
far less tied to projects and far more generally usable to support rehabilita­
tion and the operation of key existing capacity. Third, for most purposes 1n 
most sub-Saharan states, with a handful of possible m1ddle-1ncome group excep­
tions (23), grant or heavily concessional funds are needed. Fourth, as stres­
sed by the Commonwealth's Lever Commission (24), sub-Saharan Africa cannot 
possibly repay existing debt as scheduled; present levels of debt service, 
even after any plausible commercial arrears reduction programme, are quite 
unmanageable for over half the sub-Saharan states. Concerted attention to 
long-term debt reconstruction and consolidation as well as accompanying new 
money, and radical Improvement 1 n debt recording and management, are priori­
ties for most sub-Saharan countries.
Areas of controversy and/or confusion
Seven areas appear to generate substantial controversy —  part real, 1n 
part arising out of diverse concrete cases, and 1 n part out of confusion 1 n 
terminology. These are efficiency, prices, protecting vulnerable groups of 
people, population growth, raising savings and Investment rates, employment, 
and supply and/or versus demand management.
The problem surrounding efficiency 1s that 1t requires specific 
qualification as to efficiency for what purposes and to whose benefit. It 1s 
not logically possible to say whether a policy resource allocation, or an 
enterprise, 1 s efficient until Its goals and Intended beneficiaries are speci­
fied. Import non-1ntens1ty, export Intensity, total scarce resource cost, 
profitability, contribution to real GDP are all valid criteria of efficiency 
1 n a number of contexts, but unfortuntely they do not necessarily give the 
same answers. Further, present and future efficiency often diverge, and time 
discount Issues arise. Also, there are costs 1n overriding political/economic 
preferences rooted 1 n the particular circumstances of Individual countries.
Prices (Including exchange rates) are critical 1n respect to Incentives 
and to macro- and micro-economic management. As such they need to be con­
sistent, and to be managed so as to facilitate regaining a viable external 
balance position. Up to this point there 1s general agreement, and that 
agreement suggests the need for substantial price changes (Including substan­
tial devaluations) 1n many sub-Saharan economies. From here on the basic 
Issues seem to be:
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how much price management 1s needed and for what purpose; I.e. hov 
Imperfect are sub-Saharan markets under present conditions of e x ­
treme scarcity?
how generally appropriate 1 s the price mechanism for basic services 
(e.g. health) and for other goods whose broad uses have external 
economies to communities and countries?
__ how far can economic management via prices go, and 1 n what cases 
should other economically based allocation devices be used 
(e.g. bank credit, foreign exchange, certain basic consumer goods)?
-- how generally can tax/subs 1 dy price Incentives be used; e.g. 1 s the 
proposal to use them to deter and reverse deforestation and bush
cutting, soil erosion and similar economic degradation by poor 
peasants practicable or efficient? f
how fast can major adjustments be made without fracturing already 
weak structures or setting off Inflationary forces which rapidly 
cancel attempted once and for all "shock treatment" changes (e.g. 1 r 
exchange rates)? (25)
-- when do the benefits of certain types of price manipulation, e.g. 
cost-plus based price controls, uniform farmgate prices, and pre-set 
seasonal or multiyear prices for crops, outweigh the costs?
These are all legitimate questions which are 1n danger of being 
obscured or answered at a sweeplngly general level when 1 n fact the answers 
vary significantly from country to country, price to price and time to time, 
workable answers can only be formulated 1 n specific contexts by those who will 
nave to Implement them and U v e  with the consequences. Also, they will need 
regular review and, like prices themselves, to be changed from time to time.
A related set of arguments turning on prices 1s really about Income 
distribution and, unfortunately, tend to be conducted on both sides with 
Httle effort to estimate when the actual Impact would be. For example 1n
Tanzania current proposals to close the recurrent budget deficit, Increase 
overall enterprise profits and raise real grower prices 25-50 per cent would 
require lowering real wages, salaries and Informal sector Incomes by at least 
50 per cent (following a 50 per cent fall over 1979-83). This 1s politically 
impracticable. Also given that the minimum wage's purchasing power 1s about
?5 per cent below the average peasant household effective real Income, while
wage earner average productivity 1 s substantially higher, such a course would 
seem to pose economic efficiency and equity problems. One would also have to 
consider that some wage earners would probably respond by moonlighting, theft, 
corruption and a number of other practices whose personal economic efficiency 
1s high but whose systemic cost 1s probably even higher. Within a context of 
stagnant or falling national purchasing power (GDP adjusted for terms of trade 
changes) there are few or no degrees of freedom for raising any broad group of 
real Incomes significantly —  by relative price changes or any other route —  
unless an almost Immediate net gain 1 n production equivalent to the real In­
come increase can be anticipated with reasonable certainty, or unless soft 
external finance to cover the costs to other groups Is available.
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Protecting vulnerable groups 1s partly a matter of economic prudence 
because 1n sub-Saharan Africa children (26) and women are particularly vulner­
able and the medium-term economic cost of not protecting them 1s high. How­
ever, there are other vulnerable groups, such as farmers and pastorallsts 
pushed Into sub-marg1 nal, high risk areas, and much of the urban Informal 
sector. As the Lever Report commented, "erosion 1n living standards has 
pushed their peoples to the margin of tolerance" (27), a point truest for 
vulnerable groups. There 1s a growing awareness that production-oriented 
strategies and heavy reliance on market pricing do threaten vulnerable 
groups (28). The debate 1s on what groups are seriously at risk, how they can 
be shielded and what approaches are cost efficient.
One protection (which has rarely been maintained) 1s continued access 
to basic services, and a second (which 1 s eroding) 1 s drought or famine 
relief, Including food-for-work rural construction schemes. The basic answer 
however must H e  1 n making 1 t possible for members of these groups to raise 
productivity and reduce risk. This requires research on what 1s practicable 
1 n any actual context, and also a recognition that the economic payoff may be 
low and that the additional output (or Its proceeds 1 f sold) will be virtually 
all consumed by the producing households. In urban areas removal of petty 
regulations (e.g. licensing, banning various types of vendors and other 
service sellers) and of fees (e.g. on standpipe water and on petty trading) 
can be valuable out of all proportion to any revenue or other loss (29).
Subsidies and transfer payments cannot be a general answer, since 
budgetary funds are not available to finance them. Some selective ones may be 
practicable, such as school meals, sem 1 -subs1 d 1 sed employment for crippled or 
blind persons with no relatives to support them, but not much more. This 1s 
an area 1 n which the private and voluntary sectors, as well as the more 
traditional extended family and kinship groups, should be mobilised to help.
Rapid population growth 1n the sub-Saharan context exacerbates the food 
availability crisis. A close succession of pregnancies 1s damaging to the 
health of both mother and child, and to the family's ability to feed, clothe, 
and educate the children. That much 1s broadly (or at least Increasingly) 
agreed whatever the debates about optimum population size; crude pro-natal1 sm 
1 s on the whole 1 n retreat.
However, there 1s less agreement on what Instruments are effective 1n 
reducing birth rates. There 1s a tendency for proponents of one Instrument to 
Ignore others. Education, for both mothers and for children, 1s associated 
with smaller and better spaced families and lower Infant mortality. Histori­
cally, falls 1 n birth rates have been associated with Increases 1 n old age 
security (not necessarily by state schemes), and by Increases 1 n real family 
Incomes; these conditions will prove hard to meet 1n sub-Saharan Africa. In 
their absence more demographic research and state pronouncements (except 
perhaps on child spacing) will have relatively little Impact. Access to 
family planning knowledge and requisites will have some, albeit limited, 
Impact.
Raising domestic savings ratios 1n sub-Saharan Africa today may not be 
a generally plausible or desirable objective until exports rise substantially 
relative to GDP or external resource flows Increase significantly. In the 
context of severe foreign exchange constraints 1 n which earned Import capacity 
can at most cover critical operating Imports plus external Interest payments,
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savings ex post cannot by definition exceed the true local content of 
domestic cap1tal format1on (GFCF) (allowing for Indirect as well as direct 
,r0S\  i.e. 1t 1s likely to be limited to 40-50 per cent of GFCF. An 
'"P0r ! to raise domestic savings ex ante 1 s likely to fall, and to reduce the 
oroductlve capacity or to build up "Investment" 1 n stocks of goods
U't h can m  practice neither be exported nor used directly 1n GFCF. If 1t 
^  c ?d$ will, In the context of unchanged foreign exchange availability, 
tUCC*we a consumption cut two or three times as large because of the high
nV°rt content of GFCF; therefore, while capacity growth will be enhanced, 
will be at the cost of falling capacity utilisation and lower total
'r ^fnt output (this point 1s further elaborated below). These constraints
-bviously do not bind so tightly once significant export growth 1 s achieved or 
°f additional foreign resource flows allow substantial rehabilitation and
recovery.
Pr od uct iv e employment 1s critical to sub-Saharan economic recovery, and 
since unskilled labour 1 n the region 1 s relatively plentiful Its use 1 s 
logically central to any production enhancing strategy. Equally, production 
*M ch excludes much of the labour force will exclude many households from dis­
tribution benefits. Both points H e  behind the switch of emphasis away from 
U r g e  farms which are, for most crops and under most conditions (30), both 
cost and foreign exchange Inefficient when compared to many peasant pro­
ducers. More generally, serious attention must be paid to how labour In­
tensity can be augmented and how unskilled (or newly sem1 -sk1 1 led) labour pro­
ductivity can be enhanced. This question has rarely been given the policy 
priority 1 t warrants from the production and distribution/participation view­
points; attention has usually focused on manufacturing, and has paid too 
little attention to construction, maintenance and repair, and other services.
In a different sense employment 1 n large-scale establishments 1 s a 
problem because reduced output has reduced productivity, and falling real 
«ages have eroded Incentives and thus yet further lowered productivity, 
unless output, whether 1 n health, education or directly productive enter­
prises. can be restored, a real case exists for reducing the numbers employed 
and using a substantial part of the savings to Increase the real wages of 
those still employed (31). For lack of Inputs, at least half of Tanzania's 
SO 000 or so agricultural extension and related workers have negligible pro­
ductivity, and a case can be made for a 50 per cent retrenchment combined with 
a ? 6 per cent wage Increase and more complementary Inputs for those still 
employed. The problem with this approach (apart from the serious one of op­
position by a well organised group of losers) 1 s that 1 t may create a new 
vulnerable group requiring support to re-establish Itself.
Disagreement over demand vs. supply management tends to be at cross 
purposes because of the varying meaning of the terms. Demand management 
whether Keynesian or IHF-1st) tends to concentrate on macro monetary aggre­
gates. In the African context 1t concentrates on reducing resource use to 
correspond to supply. While macro aggregates are Important, they are far from 
everything. Achieving balance 1s a priority for attaining stabilisation, but 
since the present crises were largely precipitated by supply collapses, and 
manifest themselves 1 n capacity under-ut1 l1 sat1 on and specific resource Im­
balances, a strong case exists against unselectlve m^cro-demand cutting as the 
prime route to stabilisation.
Supply management has two very different strands: macro Ideological
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(as 1n Laffer Curves) and micro contextual (as In World Bank structural 
adjustment programming). The relevance of the former to sub-Saharan Africa 1s 
very limited. The latter 1s critical. Restoring supply and altering Its 
structure to remove specific Imbalances (e.g. 1 n food, energy and foreign 
exchange) 1 s the basis for pushing available resources (supply) back up to 
previous levels of resource use (demand). Whether SAPs as now designed are 
optimal 1 s a secondary Issue; they are serious attempts to achieve adjustment 
by Increasing production. While they ought to complement and represent a 
further stage of IMF adjustment programmes, they 1n fact are Increasingly In­
compatible with them. This 1s because IMF-style stabilisation 1s based on a 
short-term, macro-monetary model which virtually requires that demand cuts, 
and perhaps Increased GFCF, receive priority, rather than capacity rehabilita­
tion and utilisation.
The applied political economy of change
Any exercise 1n structural adjustment that goes beyond the verbal 
stages 1 s by definition an exercise 1 n applied political economy, not an 
exercise 1n economic theory or 1n technical optimality. Whether this 1s a 
good thing (as the author on balance supposes) or a bad thing (as the World 
Bank clearly believes) 1s somewhat beside the point: 1t 1s an objective
reality just as much as the levels of rainfall or the need to restore levels 
of critical Imports.
That statement has definite Implications. Applied political economy 
beyond the most general principles exists and operates 1 n specific contexts 
and within specific constraints and parameters. It 1s never value free, and 
the values and decision-taking coalitions which back and Intend to benefit 
from adjustment vary from state to state, over time and, usually, from sector 
to sector and Institution to Institution. To attempt to abstract from these 
contexts, parameters and values (whether by Ignoring them or by seeing, con­
demning and prescribing 1 n contradiction to them) 1 s an exercise 1 n partial or 
total futility. When the prescription Ignores or repudiates basic goals and 
values of the dominant decision-taking coalition 1 t 1 s likely to be seen as a 
direct challenge; 1 t then addresses basic political Issues and clearly moves 
beyond even applied political economy. Too many external prescriptions either 
accidentally or willfully Ignore this fact (32). Whether external political 
economists and development agencies are appropriate bodies to prescribe to 
sub-Saharan states on basic political Issues 1s, at the least, open to 
question.
Contexts, parameters, goals and values do change and evolve. At any 
time there are likely to be degrees of freedom within them —  often quite 
significant ones. Changing them over time 1s a logical and fairly standard 
objective of applied political economy. But to utilise degrees of freedom or 
to alter constraints requires that they be explicitly Identified. While 
designers, articulators, validators and Implementers of applied political 
economy can and do make economic history, they cannot do so 1 n any way they 
may wish.
Parameters such as Imports to GDP, Imports to GFCF, overall and 
sectoral production growth trends, output-employment ratios, debt-servlce 
ratios, current external account trends and projections, and factor share 
distribution ratios, are Important to the applied economic strategy of
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tion and renewed development 1n two very different ways. In the 
lt Sa they offer guides to what constraints are binding and what degrees 
ihort run por example, 1f the direct Import content of GFCF 1s 45 per
0 4 ree o ^  other production (Including the domestic component of GFCF) 
c,nt an cent —  roughly the position 1n Zimbabwe -- then raising GFCF by any 
U  P mount within a constant total expenditure requires 0.36 times that
9 ,fr\ dmore Imports (33). To make the shift with constant foreign exchange
- 1 1 1 y would require three times as large a reduction of consumption, 
d reduction 1 n total current output of about twice the eventual Increase 
,f> 6 FCF This revealed constraint suggests exploration of degrees of freedom 
*r d types Investment and production methods which are less Import 1 n- 
’0“\ ve or less capital Intensive (e.g. labour Intensive construction, shallow 
,ff)u instead of boreholes). In the short run such freedom may be fairly 
n« u e d ,  but 1 n the medium-term It should not be negligible.
The second use 1s to focus attention on how constrictive parameters 
■ ight be altered. In the case of Zimbabwe, which has an Integrated Iron and 
tffl industrial sector and an engineering-transport equlpment-spares and 
machinery sector, but a relatively weak articulation between the two, 1 t 
■trongly suggests Investigating how steel Industry rehabilitation and 
upanslon could be structured to Increase linkages with the metal-using 
GíCF oriented sectors. Thus national economic Integration would be strength­
ened, and direct and Indirect Import content Investment reduced.
It 1s Important to know and to act on parameters 1n both these ways.
10 ignore their short-term constraint Implications (or the degrees of freedom 
„Uhln them) 1s usually a recipe for failure. However, to accept these con­
straints and limited degrees of freedom as permanently binding 1 s to fall to 
recognise the possibility of creative structural adjustment, and to fall to 
achieve the possible.
'oward the beginnings of revival
Sub-Saharan Africa's economic malaise can be overcome. There 1s a 
growing Identification of causes and of areas 1n which action 1s needed. 
There 1 s also, albeit less clearly. Identification of what actions are both 
desirable and practicable not merely at sub-cont1 nental but, more Important, 
at national, sectoral and local levels. This knowledge 1s now Informing the 
attitudes and priorities of a growing number of African decision takers, 
states and Institutions and —  more slowly —  external agencies and decision
taxers. However, there are several areas of awareness which are less
evidently or generally present:
a) A realisation of how serious the problems and prospects are, viz.
how much capacity has been eroded, how fast debt service 1 s likely 
to cut net capital Inflows, how little benefit will be gained
—  without significant structural change —  from the trickle out of 
any OECD recovery;
b) a parallel realisation of how urgent 1 t 1 s to articulate and execute 
coherent strategy and policy changes, both because failure tends to 
become self-perpetuating and because the time lags between execution 
and Initial positive results 1s likely to be 12 to 24 months, and to 
full recovery five to ten years.
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%c) a partly consequential failure of Africans to Inform and educate 
Africans as to the realities and the options open to them 1n order 
to mobilise support for renewed (and painful) effort, based both on 
an appreciation of how dire the realities and how restricted the 
options, and also on a belief that something can be achieved;
d) adequate levels of external resource flows. 1 n a form which can be 
used to support strategies and agendas of the type discussed and 
which are made available fast enough to allow Implementation to
begin (and the strategy to be perfected during Its operation);
there must not be such delays that the underlying situation worsens 
so much as to require a basically new (and poorer) strategy/pol1 cy 
package;
e) enough African Involvement 1n Intellectual explanation and dialogue 
and especially 1 n strategy-pollcy-praxis design and articulation, 
enough recognition among external actors that without such Involve­
ment the success of any strategy or agenda 1 s Improbable, and the 
need for respect for and Interaction with African Initiatives, even 
1 f these, like the external ones, are so far Imperfect and In­
complete.
The last point may require elaborating. Evaluations of aid efficiency 
at project level show that lack of substantive technical and decision taker 
African Involvement 1n design and execution regularly leads to poor and In­
effective projects. These negative effects are likely to be even more severe 
at sectoral, macro-economic and macro-pol1t1ca1 levels. Strategies and their 
articulation can, up to a point, be Imposed on desperate countries. But they 
are unlikely to avoid major technical flaws, to be Implemented more than 
grudgingly and partially, or to yield the Intended results of their sponsors 
—  as a number of Institutions have presumably discovered 1n Zaire over the 
past decade.
Verbally this reality 1s widely accepted. In practice 1t 1s not. 
Whether extra-African Individuals and agencies know more about sub-Saharan 
Africa than Africans 1s open to doubt (1 n some cases and areas perhaps so);
but 1t 1s Indisputable that only Africans and African bodies are primarily and
permanently committed to achieving African development, and 1t 1s they who 
will reap the main costs of failure.
This 1s not to deny the Importance of reinforcing African knowledge and 
Institutional capacity through transfers of knowledge, technology and 
personnel embodying them. More such transfers are needed, albeit with better 
quality control, selectivity, realisation of divergences 1 n national needs and 
absorptive capacity, and humility as to capacities and limitations. But far 
more than now they should be chosen by Africans, work within African Institu­
tional contexts, be meaningfully responsible and accountable to Africans and 
have limited autonomous powers. "Have a headache? Take two expatriates" has 
at times worked well 1 n a technlco-managerlal context, but 1 t 1 s neither 
generally practicable nor desirable even 1 n the short run, and 1 t 1 s In­
herently dangerously addictive (34).
These elements —  recognition of seriousness and urgency, mobilisation, 
external resource flows, African Involvement and leadership together with 
external acceptance of and respect for 1 t —  are 1 n themselves urgent and
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serious. But external agents can only have a preponderant role 1n two of 
these areas: external resources, and external acceptance of African leader­
ship. Even 1n these areas the external response might well be more positive 
1f African governments, decision takers and Intellectuals were more and more 
creatively assertive.
¡t 1s necessary to approach the struggle toward agendas for 
stab 1 1 1 sat 1 on-r ehab 1 11 tat 1 on-recovery-renewed development with a clear realis­
ation of how difficult the task will be and how long 1t 1s likely to take. 
Facile hopes and optimistic projections, whether of export growth, external 
resource flows, or probable results (and their timing) from domestic policy 
measures, have been one of the banes of both Internal and external efforts to 
date; dashed hopes and broken efforts have made the current task all the 
harder.
However, 1t 1s equally necessary (at least for those whose Interest 1s 
more than Intellectual) to approach the struggle with a belief that something 
can be achieved, that economic malaise can be overcome and political-economic 
development renewed. The belief 1n powerlessness and the certainty of failure 
1s almost always self-validating.
Both optimism and pessimism are needed, but not the optimism of the 
Intellect and pessimism of the will which have characterised too many efforts 
to date. As formulated by Antonio Gramscl: what 1s needed 1s pessimism of
the Intellect (Including recognition of past errors, especially one's own, and 
scepticism about the extent of one's knowledge and the present perfection of 
one's measures), and optimism of the will. At the least 1t 1s possible still 
to be among or to stand with those African peasants and workers. Intellectuals 
and managers, businessmen and civil servants, community and political leaders 
who "remain undefeated ... because we have gone on trying".
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2. Estimated from United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts. New York, 
various years.
3. This 1 s contrary to the view given 1n the Bank's Accelerated Develop­
ment Report (op. c1t.) and was not Identified 1n earlier critiques of 
that report, e.g. Allison and Green (op. clt.l.
4. Optimistic 1n the sense that the global context 1s likely to be less 
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Saharan Africa from the 1970s on.
7. Zimbabwe macro and sectoral data suggest that, with no terms of trade
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for a $400-500 million current account deficit, a 4 to 5 per cent GDP 
growth rate and a 2 to 3 per cent capacity growth rate could be 
achieved over 1985-1990 —  a better result than could reasonably be
projected for a majority of Sub-Saharan economies.
8 . Many present transfers are unsuitable because they are tied to
relatively low priority capital projects at too high Interest rates/too 
brief repayment periods to be compatible with realistic estimates of
the time required for transít1on/stab111at1on/renewed development. IMF 
drawings fall 1 n this logically unsuitable category both as to terms 
and as to rates.
9. This proposition has been challenged from two directions: first that
global recovery would bring trade volume and terms Improvements ade­
quate to allow stabilisation and recovery, and second that a rapid de­
linking from Imports could form the basis of a practicable short-term
adjustment and recovery strategy. The first may well be true for a few
economies, but for many would require 50-100 per cent short-term export
volume Increases and/or 25-50 per cent terms of trade recovery, neither
of which 1s plausible. The second 1s simply Implausible; present 
Import volume and structure (following the 1980-84 Import compression), 
and any plausible options for structural change, means that structural 
change requires an Increased ability to Import.
10. Import make-up often needs changing and Import to GDP ratios may be
reducible, but 1n a majority of sub-Saharan economies almost all non- 
essential and many essential Imports have been cut and the 1mport/GDP 
ratio 1 s unsustalnably low because maintenance Imports are being "de­
ferred". As G.K. Hellelner has demonstrated, sub-Saharan economies are 
very vulnerable to Import fluctuations and slgnflcant declines are 
almost always accompanied by serious overall weakening of their econ­
omies. The relationship between GDP and Imports 1s two-way, stagnation 
or decline of either 1 s a cause as well as a result of stagnation or 
decline of the other.
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Because the growth rates of savings and of exports will need to exceed 
that of GOP, consumption growth will be lowered.
I Sustained Development, op. c1t.
See Ibid and, e.g. "The World Bank's Agenda for the Crises 1n Agri­
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by J.C.N. Paul and papers by K.Y. Amoaka and S. Please, R.H. Green and 
M. Schulthels 1n African Studies Review (forthcoming) and Ndegwa, 
Mure1th1, Green, op. c1t.
4 see sources cited at note 13 and C. Allison and R.H. Green, op. c1t.
E.g. in 1983, 50 to 75 000 tonnes of potatoes —  a private sector
iwrketed crop —  rotted 1n Tanzania because of lack of buyers and 
transport, thus directly Increasing grain Import needs by about the 
same amount.
b Famine relief clearly cannot be seen as a satisfactory permanent answer
from either the state or the peasant point of view.
! 7 For a fuller discussion see M. Fransman (editor), Industry and Ac­
cumulation 1n Africa. Helnemann, London, 1982, especially chapters by 
M .A . Blenefeld, A. Coulson, H. Fransman, R.H. Green.
8 Thus compares to the 60 to 70 per cent capacity utilisation rates 1n
the late 1970s.
1 9 . The nominally lost output 1s, under conditions of severe Import con­
strained capacity underutilisation, probably not lost but rather post­
poned; unplanned Interruptions are more costly than planned short-time 
working and may cause loss of goods 1 n process at the time.
?0. Cf. C. Colclough, "Are African Governments as unproductive as the Ac­
celerated Development Report Implies?" 1n Allison and Green, op. c1t.
?l . If they are profitable then there 1s no general case for closing them.
??. E.g. 1n Tanzania 1n the middle to late 1970s the large scale public
enterprise manufacturing sector had higher capacity utilisation ratios 
than the private (IBRD and IL0 data), and higher ratios of profits to 
output (admittedly based on company tax data); 1n 1983 analysis of 
several major sub-sectors of manufacturing showed substantially higher 
average output value to foreign exchange allocation ratios for public 
than 1n private enterprises. Similarly ratios of grower receipts to 
retail prices 1n private sector marketed staple food crops (e.g. Irish 
potatoes, cooking bananas) do not seem to be higher than for public 
sector marketed grains.
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much truly soft finance; the best nationally achievable terms for the 
bulk of their external finance appears to be 10 per cent and 5 plus 10 
years (e.g. the terms of World Bank and some export credits), and this 
may be useable 1 n medium-term stabilisation through development 
strategies.
24. The Debt Crisis and the World Economy. London, 1984.
25. In a moderately strong economy able to offset the worst costs for
selected groups (e.g. minimum wage earners and peasants), massive rapid 
changes can sometimes work. In 1974 Tanzania did adjust prices, In­
comes and taxes to accomodate 1972-74 oil, grain and general Import 
price Increases over a s 1 x-month period, and then regained -ough 
balance and 1 0  per cent Inflation within a year.
26. See R. Jolly and G.A. Cornla (editors). The Impact of World Recession
on Children. (World Development 12-3, March 1984), especially articles 
by Jolly and Cornla, R.H. Green and H.W. Singer and K.N. Raj.
27. The Debt Crisis, op. c1t.
28. The World Bank now appears to accept this position and also the need to
devise "cost effectlve"means to shield vulnerable groups, but has 
devoted little attention to defining what that might mean 1 n practice.
29. Most such fees, taxes and regulations are both cost-1neff 1c1ent and
control-Inefficient.
30. There are exceptions, and a major present large farm sector should not 
be run down unless and until adequate replacement production has been 
built up.
31. While the World Bank has not overtly proposed this combination of
employment cuts and wage Increases, the logic of Its present position
—  that public expenditure requires further pruning, employment and 
wages are now too large relative to complementary Inputs, and that 1 n 
key sectors (e.g. health, education, agricultural research) wages and 
salaries are often too low to provide adequate 1 ncent1 vés —  would seem 
to lead to 1 t.
32. At least one would like to hope they do! Some do not —  they recognise 
1 t and seek to use applied political economic prescriptions to secure 
basic political change. This may well be defensible 1n respect to 
regimes such as those of Nguema, Amin, Bokasa, Botha (1n South Africa 
or a fortiori Namibia) but does appear to be used rather more widely.
'  • *
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*3 3 . The calculation 1s:
Capital goods Import coefficient 0.45 (x 1): 0.45
plus Indirect Import content (general 
Import coefficient x "local content"
of investment) 0.2 (x 0.55): 0.11
minus Import saving on reduced consumption 0 . 2  (x 1 ): - 0 . 2 0
equals net additional Imports required = p.36
34. The diversity here 1s, or should be, largely temporal. Ghana —  1f a 
dynamic of recovery and of hope could lead to an Ingathering of Its 
widely dispersed personpower —  needs far fewer, far less generalised, 
and far less long-stay personnel (and Instead needs more specialised 
and selective knowledge Inputs) than Tanzania, Tanzania than Botswana, 
and Botswana than Namibia at Independence. Similarly a new sector or 
project —  e.g. petrochemicals 1n Mozambique, railway operation 1n 
Botswana, oil production 1n the Cameroon —  Initially needs far more 
external knowledge and personnel Inputs than 1 t should a decade after 
Its establishment (e.g. any of those sectors 1n Algeria).
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